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WHEN NICE GUYS FINISH FIRST: THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION, THE STUDY OF LAW, AND THE
ORDERING OF LEGAL REGIMES
Neel P. Parekh*
This Note adds to the scholarship in the area of Evolutionary Analysis and the
Law (EA). EA is a paradigm that comments on the implications of evolution on
the law. EA recognizes that many complex human behaviors that the law seeks to
regulate have evolutionary origins that remain relevant today. This Note details
how an understanding of the evolutionary basis of cooperation can bring about
favorable revisions and reforms in the law.
Following a review of the scientific foundation of EA, this Note sets forth the
proposition that humans have an evolutionarily developed tendency to cooperate,
an idea that contrasts the widely held belief that the evolutionary man is purely
self-interested. This Note does, however, observe that the tendency to cooperate is
not expressed at all times. This Note then explores the implications of EA on other
areas of legal scholarship, such as behavioral law and economics, default rules in
partnership law, and efficient mechanisms of trade. This Note concludes by ad-
dressing the concerns of EA critics and mapping a path for the future of EA.
Curiosity is an interesting thing. Proverbs tell us of its danger;
our mothers implore us to stay clear of it. But in the end, where
would we be without curiosity? Imagine life today absent Euclid's
concern for lines and shapes, Newton's interest in gravity and
mathematics, and Einstein's intrigue of space and time. Our lives
today might closely resemble those of our hunter-gatherer ances-
tors. But because of curiosity, we live in a novel society ripe with
scientific discovery and technological innovation. Given this, we
might thank (or blame) curiosity for our present situation-for e-
mails, airplanes, instant coffee machines, and, of course, reality TV.
It is this curiosity that no doubt encouraged Charles Darwin to
amble onto the H.M.S. Beagle and embark on the five year journey
that took him a hemisphere away from home. From Darwin's ea-
gerness and desire to observe and catalogue nature, Victorian
society learned of evolution and the engine that shaped mankind,
natural selection. "Darwin made it plausible to believe that human
beings, like plants and animals, originate in physical nature and in
a manner that accords with causal laws."' To continue the theme,
thank curiosity for Darwin's theory of evolution.
* A.B. 2000, Brown University; J.D. 2003 University of Michigan Law School. Special
thanks to ProfessorJames E. Krier.
1. ROGER SMITH, THE NORTON HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 453 (1997).
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Theorists in the modern era, more than a century after Darwin
put his thoughts to print, have since developed upon his ideas. For
example, in 1972 Richard Dawkins' The Selfish Gene built upon the
works of other biologists, primarily W.D. Hamilton and George C.
Williams, to argue that evolution is not centered upon the success
of the group, but the prosperity of the gene.2 With this theory of
micro-evolution came new views of human nature and the origins
of behavior.
Despite this progress and the deep implications evolution has
for the study of human nature, those engaged in the study of man
have scarce considered, let alone incorporated, biology's findings.
"Philosophy and the subjects known as 'humanities' are still taught
almost as if Darwin had never lived., 3 Similarly, conventional eco-
nomics, despite its focus on anticipating human decisions and the
presumption of man as a rational actor, ignores the implications
biology has for its theories. This omission must trouble biologists.
As Richard Alexander noted, "[e]very thoughtful biologist has to
be dismayed at the failure of the social sciences to acknowledge
and absorb the principles of biology as the biologists believe they
have acknowledged and absorbed the principles of chemistry and
physics." 4 This failure of social science presents more than an epis-
temological concern. In the end, social science's inability to
incorporate biology's findings more practically means its cathedral
houses a number of aged ideas and axioms that need revision.
Thankfully, this denial by social science is not absolute. Psychol-
ogy, for one, openly embraced biological advances of late. The
temptation to do so must have been great; after all, biology pro-
vides the most advanced and complete structural and functional
descriptions of the psychologist's ultimate subject-the brain. Evo-
lutionary psychologists lead this project to fuse neo-Darwinism with
studies of the human mind and behavior. For these scholars, "the
designs of decision rationality and behavioral strategies are gener-
ated and shaped by natural selection and sexual selection in the
evolutionary environments of adaptation. 5 Accordingly, the task of
evolutionary psychology is "to show how elegantly the theory of
2. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1989). A number of theorists dissent with
the gene-centered view of evolution, instead arguing that selection occurs at the level of the
group. See generally V.C. WYNNE-EDWARDS, EVOLUTION THROUGH GROUP SELECTION (1986).
3. DAWKINS, supra note 2, at 1.
4. Richard D. Alexander, The Evolution of Social Behavior, 5 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYS-
TEMATICS 325, 326 (1974).
5. Xiao-Tian Wang, Introduction: Bounded Rationality of Economic Man: New Frontiers in
Evolutionary Psychology and Bioecononics, 3J. BIOECONOMICs 83, 85 (2001).
[VOL. 37:3
S When Nice Guys Finish First
natural selection, as understood today, reveals the contours of the
human mind."6
These Darwinian perspectives from biology and psychology en-
abled and encouraged evolution-sensitive approaches in other
fields interested in human behavior. One of the most recent para-
digms to emerge is the study of Evolutionary Analysis and the Law
("EA").' This view, as its name suggests, notes the implications evo-
lution has for the law by specifically recognizing that "many
complex human behaviors that the law seeks to regulate ... have
evolutionary origins in the deep ancestral past-origins that re-
main relevant today."" Studying the evolutionary sources of
behavior provides insight into the nature and cause of human ac-
tions. Given that the law aims to both regulate and encourage
particular behaviors, this understanding is invaluable.
At heart, EA's premise is simple: if the law seeks to affect behav-
ior, it must understand the roots of behavior. Since behavior is a
product of the brain, we must comprehend the brain. But to know
the brain, and accordingly behavior, we must consider the qualities
natural selection endowed it with. This path leads us straight to
evolution: to examine the brain and behavior that natural selection
created in humans so that they could survive and propagate in
their ancestral environment, or as biologists refer to it, the envi-
ronment of evolutionary adaptation (the "EEA").
What tangible help can EA provide? In recent years, legal schol-
ars applied EA to re-evaluate legal theories, to explain the origins
of laws, and to suggest amendments to our legal regime. In just a
brief sampling, the movement endeavored to theorize behavioral
law and economics,9 explain the origins of and best response to
6. ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSY-
CHOLOGY 11 (1994). For a general review of evolutionary psychology, see HENRY PLOTKIN,
EVOLUTION IN MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (1998).
7. A number of articles have been written as of late on EA. See, for example, Neel P.
Parekh, Note, Theorizing Behavioral Law and Economics: A Defense of Evolutionary Analysis and
the Law, 36 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 209 (2002); Owen D.Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the
Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1141
(2001) [hereinafter Jones, Time]; Owen D.Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward
Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999) [hereinafter Jones, Biology of Rape];
Owen D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39JURIMETRICS J. 283 (1999); Owen D.
Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in the Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C.
L. REv. 1117 (1997) [hereinafter Jones, Child Abuse]; JOHN H. BECKSTROM, EVOLUTIONARY
JURISPRUDENCE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF MODERN DARWINISM
THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PROCESS (1989).
8. Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 7, at 1121.
9. Parekh, supra note 7;Jones, Time, supra note 7.
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rape,' O define the roots of child abuse," and account for the trag-
edy of the commons. 2 This Note hopes to add to this scholarship
by detailing how an understanding of the evolutionary basis of co-
operation can bring about favorable revisions and reforms in the
law.
This examination of cooperation will follow traditional EA
analysis. Part I will first review the applicable science behind evolu-
tion, including a brief primer on the brain and behavior. Having
discussed these two, we can then understand the foundational
principles of EA. In Part II the Note will examine the evolutionary
strategies of altruism and reciprocity to show that humans, con-
trary to the popular conception of the evolutionary man as purely
self-interested, are pre-wired to cooperate. Finally, in Part III, after
citing the prevalence of cooperation in particular settings, the
Note will discuss the implications this knowledge of cooperation
has for legal scholarship and legal systems. It will primarily show
how an awareness of cooperation can lead to reforms in legal theo-
ries, by partially theorizing behavioral law and economics, and in
specific legal rules.
PART I: THE SCIENCE OF EA
A. Evolution
"Today the theory of evolution is about as much open to doubt
as the theory that the earth goes round the sun.... ,,s The concept
as most understand it is fairly simple: the fittest species are the
ones that survive. This characterization is, however, remarkably
crude. In attempts to better elucidate the theory of evolution and
natural selection, biologists refined this depiction; in doing so, they
showed that there is more to evolution than survival of the species.
In fact, "the fundamental unit of selection ... is not the species,
nor the group, nor even, strictly, the individual. It is the gene, the
unit of heredity.'
14
10. Jones, Biology of Rape, supra note 7.
11. Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 7.
12. E. Donald Elliot, The Tragedy of the Commons: Evolutionary Biology, Economics and En-
vironmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 17 (2001).
13. DAWKINS, supra note 2, at 1.
14. Id. at 11. Cf WYNNE-EDWARDS, supra note 2 (arguing evolution occurs at the level
of the group).
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How can this be true? After all, we see the results of evolution
every day-it is the primacy of specific animal species, not of genes
themselves. However, when considered, this species-centered view
screams of naivet6. The process of evolution began long before
humans, other animals, or even plants existed. It began with stable
molecules, not living, but capable of replicating with speed and
accuracy. 5 As these "replicators" amassed, they drained available
resources: "[t]he primeval soup was not capable of supporting an
infinite number of replicator molecules."16 As a result, competition
emerged. In order to survive, these replicators evolved what
Dawkins refers to as survival machines." These machines were at
first merely receptacles-protective walls that shielded the replica-
tors. But these machines, during the course of millions of years
and "by a venerable and massive process of trial and error, known
as natural selection," 8 became more and more complex as the de-
mands of the environment impressed greater stress on them.
Eventually the survival machines took on bigger forms; what we
now refer to as living organisms. The replicators first housed them-
selves in single-cells, then in multicellular life, and eras later, plants
and animals. 19 What are these replicators? As Dawkins describes,
"They are in you and in me; they created us, body and mind; and
their preservation is the ultimate rationale for our existence. They
have come a long way, those replicators. Now they go by the name
of genes, and we are their survival machines."
20
This seems a bit bizarre. But if we accept the reality of evolution
through natural selection, it is the explanation that best explains
our origin. The theory is dehumanizing in some respects: we are
no more than passive hosts for parasitic genes. The joke, we might
say, is on us. Once we realize, however, that the agenda of the
genes does not devalue the nature of man, we can focus on selfish
gene theory, as this view of micro-evolution is called, as an explana-
tion of our origin and not as a tool for explaining who we are or
what we should be.
With this understanding, we know that evolution selected for
those survival machines that best preserved and propagated the
genes which housed them. But an important distinction should be
15. DAWKINS, supra note 2, at 17.
16. Id. at 18.
17. Id. at 19.
18. MArr RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS 26
(1999).
19. DAWKINS, supra note 2, at 46-47.
20. Id. at 20.
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made. Evolution did not shape life in the abstract; rather it oper-
ated in a specific environmental context. Evolutionary success
stemmed from the capability to negotiate the environment of evo-
lutionary adaptation, not just other organisms. Accordingly, the
characteristics selected for were those that enabled us to tackle
problems existing in the environment of evolutionary adaptation.
Humans are therefore particularly adept to the ecological dilem-
mas present during their period of evolution, not those challenges
peculiar to modern environments.
B. The Brain
The brain, like all of our features, was gradually crafted by natu-
ral selection. Just as evolution endowed us with opposable thumbs
and two feet, it provided us with a brain weighing approximately
three pounds and consisting of an amalgam of lobes and neural
networks. But there is more to this. Along with supplying us with a
physical brain, what we might call its hardware, evolution also im-
parted us with unique software. 1 Our brain is encoded with the
ability to perform algorithms-functions aimed at solving prob-
lems. Human sight is the classic example.2 Evolution conferred us
with the hardware to capture images (the retina) and to transfer it
to the brain (the optic nerve). But aside from this hardware, evolu-
tion also generated the software by which the brain could decipher
and perceive this negative and even store this vision as a memory
for later reference. Without this software, the hardware would be
useless.
Because evolution created our brain, its structure and function
reflect those adaptations which enhanced fitness relative to the en-
vironment. "Like other aspects of basic anatomy, the basic internal
psychological mechanisms leading to many behavioral predisposi-
tions evolved under the challenges and selection pressures posed
by particular environmental conditions."2 In the instance of the
brain, these environmental. conditions are the problems that hu-
mans and their genetic predecessors faced during the long period
of human physiological evolution. 24 The brain accordingly embod-
21. 'Some biologists refer to this "software" element of the brain as the "mind." See, e.g.,
STEPHEN PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS (1998).
22. See, e.g., id. at 51.
23. Jones, Time, supra note 7, at 1167.
24. PINKER, supra note 21, at 21.
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ies those algorithms required to negotiate the environment of evo-
lutionary adaptation.
Note, however, that though natural selection favored a brain
that enables us to survive, it did not provide us with the most ad-
vanced one because, "[f] orm follows function: the properties of an
evolved mechanism reflect the structure of the task it evolved to
solve.25 Our brain is not a supercomputer simply because the envi-
ronmental challenges we faced did not demand it to be so.
Surviving and propagating in the EEA did not, for instance, re-
quire a capacity to understand combinatorial mathematics.
Similarly, Homo sapiens is not Homo economicus because economic
rationality was not a strategy necessary for our survival. As E. 0.
Wilson notes, "[b]iological capacity evolves until it maximizes the
fitness of organisms for the niches they fill, and not a squiggle
more.'26 As a result, we might say our brains are evolutionarily
bounded.
This background helps show how evolutionary science might in-
fluence legal studies. After all, policies that require us to perform
algorithms never selected for will rarely lead to the desired behav-
ior. If, for example, the law expects us to make complex economic
calculations in resolving tort disputes, such a rule might fail be-
cause evolutionary psychologists have shown that humans cannot
perform many of the decisional tasks economics demands since
the EEA would never have required our brains to "attain" these
algorithms.27 The relevance between evolutionary sciences and the
25. Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the In-
visible Hand, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 327, 328 (1994).
26. EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 52 (1998). This
general concept, that the brain's function is derived only with respect to the challenges it
faced, is well summarized by the evolutionary psychologist Robert Wright:
The point is just that it isn't correct to say that people's minds are designed to maxi-
mize fitness, their genetic legacy. What the theory of natural selection says, rather, is
that people's minds were designed to maximize fitness in the environment in which
those minds evolved.... The question, properly put, is always whether a trait would
be in the 'genetic interest' of someone in the EEA, not in modem American or Vic-
torian England or anywhere else. Only traits that would- have propelled the genes
responsible for them through the generations in our ancestral environments should,
in theory, be part of human nature today.
WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 37-38.
27. For more on the dissonance between what economics demands of us and what evo-
lution has enabled us to do, see, for example, Catrin Rode & X.T. Wang, Risk-Sensitive
Decision Making Examined Within an Evolutionary Framework, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 926
(2000).
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law becomes even greater when we realize that the brain's algo-
rithms result in behavior.
C. Behavior
Behavior has multiple definitions. It commonly refers to how
people carry themselves, both in how they act and in what they say.
For the purposes of this Note, behavior is any muscular or physio-
28logical response. What effectuates these responses? As noted
above, behavior originates in the brain. Leda Cosmides and John
Tooby explain this when they write that the "brain is a complex
computational device, a system that takes sensory information as
input, transforms it in various ways, stores it, analyzes it, integrates
it, applies decision rules to it, and then translates the output of
those rules into the muscular contractions that we call 'behav-
ior.' "29
The process Cosmides and Tooby note, however, begins even
earlier; it commences with evolution. Legal scholar Owen Jones
states this more explicitly: "Behavior," he opines, "requires both
perception and information processing. Perception and informa-
tion processing are thoroughly dependent on brain function.
Brain function reflects the evolutionary processes that built the
brain's intricate functionality. Therefore, behavior-the principal
output of the brain-reflects evolutionary processes."0 0 Once we
consider the role evolution has in forming the brain, we realize
that evolution selected for, via the brain, behaviors that increased
fitness in the EEA.3'
For many, such a conclusion is a bit brash. To them, this argu-
ment stinks of determinism and condemns "individual people to a
heartless fate written in their genes before they were born."2 This
Note cannot attempt to respond to these claims. Rather, it assumes
28. This simple definition is one commonly used by biologists. See, e.g., DAWKINS, supra
note 2, at 47 (defining behavior as "the trick of rapid movement which has been largely
exploited by the animal branch of survival machines.").
29. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 25, at 328.
30. Jones, Time, supra note 7, at 1165.
31. Id. at 1167; Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange,
in ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 163
(Barkow et. al. eds., 1992). Robert Wright emphasizes this with the following: "[t]he thou-
sands and thousands of genes that influence human behavior-genes that build the brain
and govern neurotransmitters and other hormones, thus defining our 'mental organs'-are
here for a reason. And the reason is that they goaded our ancestors into getting their genes
into the next generation." WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 28.
32. RIDLEY, supra note 18, at 91-92.
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that man is not the tabula rasa that Locke envisioned,"3 but is in-
stead endowed by evolution with certain structural and behavioral
tendencies. This innateness, however, does not always compel us to
act in a particular manner. A genetic foundation of behavior, for
one, does not preclude human free will.3 4 Personal morality can
trump much behavior, helping us to abandon that innateness
which conflicts with our mores; cultural norms and legal rules curb
those natural behaviors deemed unfavorable. With these compet-
ing forces, as Dawkins notes, "[w]e alone, on earth, can rebel
against the tyranny of the selfish replicators. '3 5 In any case, EA will
have no use for those who disagree with this assumption. But for
those who believe that an internally consistent understanding of
evolution naturally leads to some level of innateness, EA shows
promise.
D. Concluding Part I on the Science of EA
The foundational science discussed above directs that behavior,
the principle subject upon which the law focuses, is a function of
evolution. As noted above, this understanding is remarkably rele-
vant to legal theory. The law's principal aim, in both prohibiting
some acts and motivating others, is to regulate behavior. In light of
this, an incomplete or inaccurate understanding of behavior will
preclude effective or optimal rules. To illustrate, imagine a behav-
ior that is predisposed by natural selection. If this behavior runs
counter to our customs, the law will attempt to curb it. But if such
behavior is innate, we may be unable to prevent it with conven-
tional legal rules. Knowing whether such a behavior is in our
nature can effect how we fashion remedies and regulations. 6
In such an instance, how can we discover whether the behavior
in question is hard-wired in the first place? As noted in the preced-
ing pages, "not only are all aspects of structure and function of
organisms to be understood solely as products of selection, but
33. JOHN LocKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. II, chap. 1, at
26 (Raymond Wilburn ed. 1947) (1690).
34. See generally DANIEL C. DENNETr, FREEDOM EVOLVES (2003).
35. DAWKINS, supra note 2, at 201.
36. Jones' "Law of law's leverage" illustrates this. He notes that: "[t]he magnitude of
legal intervention necessary to reduce or to increase the incidence of any human behavior
will correlate positively or negatively, respectively with the extent to which a predisposition
contributing to that behavior was adaptive for its bearers, on average, in past environments."
Jones, Time, supra note 7, at 1190.
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because of their peculiarly direct relationship to the forces of selec-
tion, behavior and life history phenomena, long neglected by the
evolutionists, may be among the most predictable of all phenotypic
attributes."3 7 A study of natural selection and the EEA can there-
fore provide insight as to what human behaviors are native.
An understanding of the evolutionary roots of behavior also im-
plicates what the law can expect of us as actors. Take, for example,
the reasonable person standard. The law, drawing mainly from
Enlightenment philosophy and from the personal experiences of
judges, created a fictional persona against whom all must be meas-
ured. This reasonable person, however, may be someone very
unlike the biological person. Perhaps, then, where the reasonable
person standard supercedes the biological person, the legal base-
line needs to be changed (normative standards permitting).
This discussion is a bit abstract. The aim is to highlight some of
the implications this understanding of behavior has for the law. But
perhaps the best way to emphasize the point is to more concretely
examine the focus of this Note-cooperation. As will be seen, rec-
ognition that cooperation, in some contexts, is an evolutionarily
developed instinctive behavior enables us to understand behavioral
law and economics, default rules in partnership law, and efficient
mechanisms of trade.
PART II: THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
Evolution is commonly understood as a zero-sum competition
where the fittest survive and the.weak wane into extinction. This
understanding leads to the somewhat frightening proposition of-
ten cited of evolution that man and all other animals are purely
self-interested. Under this view, at least in our ancestral environ-
ments and before cultural norms evolved, evolution forced us into
Hobbesian competition.
In reality, this unbridled competition does not exist. In our day-
to-day lives, cooperation abounds. We tip on the road, we give to
the homeless, and we constantly do favors for others, giving up
valuable time and resources to ends that provide us with little or no
tangible benefit. This cooperation is not specific to humans; it is
endemic to all living organisms. 8 The reality of cooperation, when
37. Alexander, supra note 4, at 325.
38. Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE
1390 (1981), reprinted in ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 88-89 (1984)
[hereinafter Axelrod & Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation] ("The theory of evolution is
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considered along with evolution, leads many to ask the following
question: "If life is a competitive struggle, why is there so much co-
operation about? And why, in particular, are people such eager
cooperators?0
s9
The phenomenon of the division of labor provides a partial an-
swer.4° Humans in all cultures segregate tasks. Some members of
primitive societies, for example, hunt and gather while others care
for children. Modem capitalism similarly relies on the division of
labor for efficient production and later consumption. Even our
bodies themselves exemplify this cooperation where each of our
physiological components perform specialized biological tasks that
benefit one another-"a red blood cell is as valuable to a liver cell
as vice versa."4 In these instances, the division of labor-a system of
cooperation-is favorable because together each person or cell can
achieve more than either can do on its own. At heart, it is a coop-
eration that grows out of self-interest.
Adam Smith himself recognized that cooperation stems not
from humanity, but self-interest. He writes:
[M] an has almost constant occasion for the help of his breth-
ren, and it is vain for him to expect'it from their benevolence
only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their
self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own
advantage to do for him what he requires of them ....
As cooperation can develop in relationships among selfish indi-
viduals, cooperative behavior can also emerge from selfish genes
where the long-term rewards from this strategy are greater for each
actor than the short-term rewards of unilateral self-interest.
43
An analysis of selfish-gene theory makes the ascendancy of co-
operation even more clear. As a reminder, micro-evolution holds
that, "always, without exception, living things are designed to do
things that enhance the chances of their genes or copies of their
genes surviving or replicating. "4 Accordingly, during natural
based on the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest. Yet cooperation is common be-
tween members of the same species and even between members of different species."). See
infra notes 73-77 for examples of cooperation.between non-humans.
39. MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 5 (1996).
40. Id. at 41.
41. Id.
42. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk.- 1, ch. II (Edwin Cannan ed., The
Modem Library 1994) (1796).
43. RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 132.
44. Id. at 18.
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selection, those genes that propagated were ones that encoded for
behaviors that enabled the survival machine to live and reproduce.
These behaviors could embody any number of strategies: "retreat,
conciliation or living and letting live."45 But the ones selected for
would have to provide the best methods of dealing with those di-
lemmas that confronted us during the EEA. During this time, the
primary challenges to animals came from interactions between kin
and a limited set of non-kin.46 As will be shown below, cooperation
in these relationships was the strategy that best increased a replica-
tor's inclusive fitness. Accordingly, cooperative behavior emerged
as an innate tendency-an evolved algorithm naturally applied
given specific environmental conditions.
So from selfish genes sprang unselfish survival machines. As for
us, while our genes have a selfish aim, mankind consistently
(though not universally) expresses unselfish behavior. In the end,
we learn that though "a predominant quality to be expected in a
successful gene is ruthless selfishness in individual behavior.. .we
shall see, there are special circumstances in which a gene can
achieve its own selfish goals best by fostering a limited form of [co-
operation] at the level of individuals." 47 What are these special
circumstances? They arise during interactions between kin and
dealings between repeat transactors; they are, in the jargon of evo-
lutionary biology, altruism and reciprocity.
48
A. Altruism
We begin our discussion of altruism with a brief observation
from the cognitive neuroscientist Steven Pinker. He writes, "Homo
sapiens are obsessed with kinship. All over the world, when people
are asked to talk about themselves, they begin with their parentage
and family ties, and in many societies, especially foraging groups,
people rattle off endless genealogies."49 The connection does not
end with mere ancestral recognition and association. Rather, when
we discover one is related to us, we feel a certain attraction and
fidelity towards them. We take in the lost cousin. We rarely deny a
parent, sibling, or child in need. And we often make remarkable
45. PINKER, supra note 21, at 428.
46. Id. at 429.
47. DAWKINS, supra note 2, at 2.
48. To confuse the issue a bit, altruism is also known as kin selection and reciprocity is
alternatively termed reciprocal altruism.
49. PINKER, supra note 21 at 430.
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sacrifices so that our kin may live a better life, even when doing so
means threatening our own existence. How can this cooperation
be explained, particularly in light of our selfish genes? As noted
above, such behavior emerges because it, in the long term, in-
creases the probability that genes will propagate when compared
with the strategy of short term self-interest.
This realization was first made by William D. Hamilton.,5 In a
short but monumental article in The American Naturalist, Hamilton
explained when altruism might emerge with the following equa-
tion:
C < B(R)
where (C) is the cost of helping another, (B) is the benefit to the
recipient's reproduction, and (R) is Wright's coefficient of related-
ness (e.g. 1/2 for siblings and parents, 1/4 for grandparents,
nephews, nieces, uncles and aunts, and 1/8 for a first cousin).
This formula, later termed Hamilton's Rule, means the following:
Every altruistic behavior has certain, in principle measurable,
actual or potential costs for the donor and benefits for the re-
cipients. A particular behavior will evolve if the cost of the
behavior to the donor is outweighed by the benefits to the re-
cipient, those benefits being weighed by the degree of genetic
relatedness between donor and recipient.
5 2
But how does this make any sense? Why, even when the cost of an
altruistic act to an individual is less than the benefit to a related
party, would one help another? Recall that evolution is about the
survival of genes, not the individual. Also note that your relatives
share a certain percentage of genes in common with you-100%
with identical twins, 50% with parents and siblings, and so on. Ac-
cordingly, while a sacrificial act may limit one's life, or even end it,
50. SeeWilliam D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior, 97 AM. NATURALIST 354
(1963), reprinted in 1 WILLIAM D. HAMILTON, THE NARROW ROADS OF GENELAND: EVOLU-
TION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 6 (1996) [hereinafter Hamilton, Altruism]. See also William D.
Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior I & II, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1
(1964), in I WILLIAM D. HAMILTON, THE NARROW ROADS OF GENELAND: EVOLUTION OF
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 6 (1996) [hereinafter Hamilton, Evolution of Social Behavior]. George C.
Williams made a major contribution to the understanding of cooperation as well. GEORGE C.
WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION (1966). The two might be considered the
co-authors of biological altruism.
51. Hamilton's Rule, as this is termed, has been discussed in countless texts. An excel-
lent discussion of this theory appears in DAWKINS, supra note 2, 90-108.
52. PLOTKIN, supra note 6, at 84.
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where that act furthers one's. relatives' survival and their prospects
to reproduce, the genes still win.53
Pregnancy provides one example. 54 Both parties, mother and fe-
tus, hope to survive, but given limited resources, both are in
conflict. Among other things, the fetus manages to divest the
mother of blood by limiting maternal control over the constriction
of the artery that supplies the placenta.5 This, in turn, results in
high blood pressure for the mother. Also, there is a struggle for
sugar: the fetus, hungry for its mother's energy, secretes hormones
that block the effect of insulin.5 ' All the while, the mother, in an
attempt to conserve her own resources, produces more and more
insulin.57 As a result of this sugar battle, mothers occasionally de-
velop gestational diabetes.
The conflict is clear, but because of Hamilton's Rule child rear-
ing evolved and continues. As Hamilton posited, "[d]espite the
principle of 'survival of the fittest' the ultimate criterion which de-
termines whether G [a gene that tends to cause some kind of
altruistic behavior] will spread is not whether the behavior is to the
benefit of the behaver but whether it is to the benefit of the gene
G. 5 8 In light of this, despite the risk imposed on the mother, preg-
nancy prevailed as a mode of reproduction because it enables a set
of genes to successfully propagate. Again, the threat to the mother
herself is not the heart of the matter; rather it is the benefit to her
genes. Accordingly, behavior that ensured their survival, namely all
the physiological relationships occurring during pregnancy, per-
sisted so long as the costs of these interactions ultimately were less
than the benefit to the genes.
Given this explanation, the prospect of cooperative behavior be-
tween related individuals becomes understandable. But there is
one element missing.' Altruism concerns acts that increase an-
other's chance of survival at the expense of the altruist's. This leads
to a paradox: "[b]y definition, altruists would be expected to have
a lower reproductive success than the selfish rivals whom they help.
Altruistic behavior should, therefore, disappear from the popula-
tion. It shouldn't exist, yet apparently it does." 9 This is because real
life is often a non-zero sum game. True, at times selfishness will
53. Hamilton, Evolution of Social Behavior, supra note 50, at 47.
54. See David Haig, Genetic Conflicts in Human Pregnancy, 68 Q. Rev. Biology 495 (1993).
55. RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 23.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Hamilton, Evolution of Social Behavior, supra note 50, at 47.
59. Mark Ridley & Richard Dawkins, The Natural Selection of Altruism 20, in'ALTRUISM
AND HELPING BEHAVIOR (J. Phillipe Rushton & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1981).
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prevail over altruism, but often selfishness does not result in a det-
riment to others. Moreover, as will be shown in the following
discussion of reciprocity, cooperation can succeed over selfishness
because it, in the long term, proves the more evolutionary stable
strategy. Given this global benefit to cooperativeness, altruism, as
discussed here, will prevail because genes that code for helping
relatives will result in the highest inclusive fitness. "With that ad-
vantage, genes for helping relatives will increase in a population
over generations. " '
B. Reciprocity
One thing is clear in the world of cooperation-unselfish acts
are not restricted to related actors. After all, we see symbiotic rela-
tionships both inter- and intra-species. Take, for example, group
living. This Note has already mentioned that division of labor is a
cooperative strategy that exists between members of a society. But
this shared responsibility occurs between both related and un-
related individuals. Though the !Kung San, a well.studied hunter-
gatherer tribe from Africa, rely primarily on altruistic acts between
related individuals for their daily survival, when these interactions
prove inadequate, the !Kung extend cooperation to more distant
kin and unrelated persons.6' This cooperation between non-kin is
also seen throughout the animal kingdom. For instance, in the
presence of a predator, birds give warning calls to non-relatives
even though such alarms draw the predator to the caller itself.
6 2
We understand such cooperation among related individuals as
increasing the inclusive fitness of a particular set of genes. From a
biological perspective, mothers help their children in part because
doing so enables the mother's genes to prosper into the future.63
60. PINKER, supra note 21, at 429.
61. Polly Wiessner, Taking the Risk out of Risky Transactions: The Forager's Dilemma, in
RISKY TRANSACTIONS: TRUST, KINSHIP, AND ETHNICITY 37 (Frank K. Salter, ed., 2002).
'62. DAWKINS, supra note 2, at 169; Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,
46 Q. REv. BIOLOGY 35, 45 (1971).
63. This seemingly takes the altruism out of altruism, meaning cooperation is at heart
selfish. Critics of the evolution of cooperation have argued that such a realization devalues
helpful actions. As will be discussed later, this view fails to recognize that simply because our
genes direct us to act in a particular manner, our behavior can still be recognized as a func-
tion of our own motives. As Dawkins writes, "it does not matter that [one] is under the order
of his genes, rather than choosing a course of action of his own free will. The deed is what
counts." DAWKINS, supra note 2, at 21. Accordingly, mothers in fact take care of their chil-
dren because they love them, not simply because their "genes"' force them to do so.
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But how can selfish gene theory explain cooperation between un-
related individuals? The answer again relies on a focus on the
greater long-term benefits of cooperation as compared to the
short-term benefits of selfishness. This understanding underlies the
theory of reciprocity.
Reciprocity is surely a familiar concept. Dawkins modestly de-
fined it as embodying the proverbial principle of "You scratch my
back, I'll scratch yours,""M but more complex definitions exist. For
example, political scientist Elinor Ostrom writes:
Reciprocity refers to a family of strategies that can be used in
social dilemmas involving (1) an effort to identify who is in-
volved, (2) an assessment of the likelihood that others are
conditional cooperators, (3) a decision to cooperate initially
with others if others are trusted to be conditional cooperators,
(4) a refusal to cooperate with those who do not reciprocate,
and (5) punishment of those who betray trust.
65
Regardless of the definition used, a complete understanding of
reciprocity requires an examination of how this strategy is an evo-
lutionarily endorsed behavior for organisms, particularly humans.
William Hamilton, the biologist who introduced kin selection to
the world, traveled to a symposium on "Man and Beast" in 1969.
There, he met Robert Trivers, a graduate student in biology.6 Triv-
ers presented Hamilton with a paper detailing his ideas of
"reciprocal altruism" (what this Note refers to as reciprocity). In it,
Trivers attempted to explain cooperation at large, rather than co-
operation simply between kin. Hamilton encouraged Trivers to
develop his ideas and publish his findings, which Trivers did two
years later in a Quarterly Review of Biology article entitled "The Evo-
lution of Reciprocal Altruism."67
In this paper, Trivers describes how self-interested actors, on the
level of the gene or the individual, could give rise to remarkable
levels of cooperation. The argument essentially expresses itself in
the Golden Rule--do unto others as you would have done to you.
Though a gross oversimplification, Trivers showed that reciproc-
ity-the exchange of beneficial acts between transactors-can
explain a number of instances of cooperation that exist in our en-
64. DAWKINS, supra note 2, at 179.
65. Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action:
Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1, 10 (1998).
66. WILLIAM D. HAMILTON, 1 NARROW ROADS TO GENELAND: THE EVOLUTION OF SO-
CIAL BEHAVIOR 262-3 (1996).
67. Trivers, supra note 62.
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vironment and among non-related individuals. He relied on the
concept repeated throughout this Note-that a concern for one-
self can give rise to cooperation where cooperation benefits genes
in the long run. In essence, "A favour done by one animal could be
repaid by a reverse favour later, to the advantage of both, so long as
the cost of doing the favour was smaller than the benefit of receiv-
ing it. Therefore, far from being altruistic, social animals might be
merely reciprocating selfishly desired favours."' Trivers opined that
this program of constant cooperative behavior can explain mutual
benefits between the simplest organisms to a number of common
human behaviors, including helping in times of danger, sharing
food, caring for the sick, aiding the young and old, and imparting
knowledge.69
So we again see how cooperation might prevail. But as noted in
the section on altruism, evolution seems to predict that actors who
cooperate can be exploited to the point of extinction by those who
do not. A transactor--one we will call a "cheater" or "defector"-
may conveniently forget to return the back scratching. After years
of such behavior, cheaters would prevail over their gullible, though
kind, counterparts. Nice guys, in essence, would finish last.
This conclusion, however, proves inaccurate. Game theorists
who embraced the neo-Darwinian dictates of micro-evolution have
shown that organisms that cooperate prevail over those that do
not. John Maynard Smith, for one, noted that, 'just as rational in-
dividuals should adopt strategies like those predicted by game
theory as the least worst in any circumstances, so natural selection
should design animals to behave instinctively with similar strate-
gies."7° This method would predict behavior that makes both
players better off at the end of the game-what Smith called an
evolutionary stable strategy and what economists refer to as the
Nash Equilibrium. To demonstrate this, Smith used a tool common
to game theorists, the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the end, Smith rea-
soned that those organisms, called Retaliators, who cooperated
frequently while punishing defection, would prevail in repeated
Prisoner Dilemmas.
This theory was confirmed some ten years later by Robert Ax-
elrod, political scientist at the University of Michigan.7' With the
advent of computers, game theorists were able to perform
68. RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 61.
69. Trivers, supra note 62, at 45.
70. J. Maynard Smith & G. R. Price, The Logic of Animal Conflict, 246 NATURE 15 (1973).
71. See generaUy Axelrod & Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, supra note 38.
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repeated runs of a variety of problems. Axelrod, particularly inter-
ested in the logic of cooperation, set up a mass Prisoner Dilemma's
game and invited people to submit programs embodying particular
strategies to see which approach was most successful at prevailing
in this game. After a number of trials Axelrod revealed the winner,
a program entitled "Tit-for-Tat." This code embodied Smith's Re-
taliator. During the first round of the Dilemma, Tit-for-Tat
cooperates. It then continues by doing whatever the other player
does in the previous move. Essentially, Tit-for-Tat is a strategy of
cooperation based on reciprocity. Given that it survived against a
variety of other strategies, including purely self-interested ones that
constantly defected in an attempt to exploit cooperation, it is clear
that "cooperation based on reciprocity can thrive in a variegated
environment.",71 Contrary to intuition, nice guys can finish first
such that behavioral strategies of altruism and reciprocity would
not have been routinely defeated by unbridled self-interest. In-
stead, cooperation through these methods emerged as innate
behavioral tendencies selected for during evolution.
C, Environmental Evidence of Altruism and Reciprocity
It is one thing to assert through computer games, equations on
paper, and ideas in print that cooperation is an evolved tendency-
that our brain, the situs of human behavior, is one that impels us to
act unselfishly-and another to demonstrate it. Thankfully, there is
ample evidence from the zoological world showing that all types of
organisms instinctively exhibit various levels of cooperation be-
tween both kin and non-kin.
Altruism, for example, accurately predicts how eusocial insects
allocate their reproductive effort among close relatives. 3 Similarly,
African vervet monkeys exhibit both altruism and reciprocity.74 As
Matt Ridley reports:
When played a tape recording of a call from one monkey re-
questing support in a fight, another monkey will respond
much more readily if the caller has helped it in the past. But if
the two are closely related, the second monkey's response
72. Id. at 96.
73. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 31, at 168.
74. RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 63.
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does not depend so much on whether the first monkey has
helped it.
75
Perhaps the most frequently cited evidence of cooperation in
76nature is that of vampire bats. Vampire bats, true to their name,
feed on blood. Given the nature of their sustenance, these bats
frequently return from feeding expeditions without any success.
Absent cooperation from other bats, individual members whose
unluckiness abounds, find the prospect of starvation a reality.
There is, however, plenty of help in these communities. Successful
bats-as predicted by evolution and reciprocity-drink more than
they require for any one meal and regurgitate extra blood for
those unable to find food. Because bats live in the same groups for
long periods of time, this unselfishness is part of a repeated game,
just like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The bats play Tit-for-Tat,
such that bats who previously donated blood will receive blood
from a prior donee when needed, -and bats who refuse to share
blood do not get blood in return. As Ridley aptly summarizes,
"[r] eciprocity rules the roost."
7
Humans display the same tendencies. Earlier this Note discussed
pregnancy and the division of labor as representations of altruism
and reciprocity. Additional evidence comes from anthropological
observations of hunter-gatherer societies. Why? Because individuals
in these societies still live in the EEA. We can consider their envi-
ronment and their behaviors to see which ones result from
evolutionary pressures. Were we to simply rely on, for example, the
behavior of those in modern Western civilization it would be diffi-
cult to see which behavioral tendencies were a result of evolution
and which were caused by other factors, such as responses to to-
day's cultural norms.
As Polly Wiessner notes, "[t]here are many statements in the
forager literature that attest to the fact that kin are the ones most
likely to engage in sharing and other forms of delayed reciprocity
that serve to pool risk." Furthermore, when people share with
non-kin, they do so with an acute "mental ledger for reciproca-
tion."79 Cooperation during the hunt is demonstrative.8 0 Despite
75. Id.
76. This discussion recasts the work of Gerald S. Wilkinson, Reciprocal Food-Sharing in
Vampire Bats, 308 NATURE 181 (1984).
77. RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 63.
78. Wissener, supra note 61, at 25.
79. PINKER, supra note 21, at 505.
80. RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 108.
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the temptation to free ride on the efforts of others, anthropologi-
cal evidence shows that hunting groups formed. While working
together, these entities also punished free riders by denying them
food because of their failure to participate. Humans, it seems, act
no differently than vampire bats.
Apart from this anthropological evidence, there is more proof
that humans have an evolutionarily developed tendency to cooper-
ate. As noted above, for reciprocity to develop individuals must be
able to identify those who have cheated in the past so they can later
punish defection. Remarkably, evolutionary psychologists have
shown that we posses the inherent ability to identify cheaters in
social contract exchanges."' In fact, we are better at identifying
cheaters than discerning altruists.82 In essence, the human brain
can perform particular algorithms to identify and recall cheaters.
Given this capacity, "Our lifestyles and our minds are particularly
adapted to the demands of reciprocal altruism."8 3 In the end, the
existence of this faculty inductively demonstrates that we are recip-
rocal animals.
D. Concluding Part II on the Evolution of Cooperation
The preceding section detailing the evolution of cooperation
demonstrates that humans (or all animals for that matter) have a
tendency for cooperation. Though examined more fully in the
20th century, others knew of this reality in earlier years. In The De-
scent of Man, Darwin himself posited:
As reasoning powers and foresight... became improved, each
man would soon learn from experience that if he aided his
fellow-men, he would commonly receive aid in return. From
this low motive, he might acquire the habit of aiding his fel-
lows.... Habits, moreover, followed during many generations
probably tend to be inherited 4
But what Darwin refers to as a legacy of habits we now know is
the inheritance of algorithms in the brain. Since cooperation was a
81. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 31, at 205.
82. RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 128. As more evidence of this ability, certain individuals
who have experienced brain damage can no longer identify cheaters. Id. at 130.
83. PINKER, supra note 21, at 403.
84. WRIGHT, supra note 6, (quoting CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SE-
LECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 163-64 (1871)).
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favorable strategy during the EEA, particularly because of the small
group life characteristic of the period, those who cooperated pre-
vailed.
To summarize: "Our minds have been built by selfish genes, but
they have been built to be social, trustworthy, and cooperative."85
Because this encoding stems from our genetic blueprint, altruism
86
and reciprocity are innate. Part III outlines some of the implica-
tions this has for the law.
PART III: IMPLICATIONS
The discussion above demonstrated that humans are pre-wired
to cooperate, although this predisposition is not expressed at all
times. Since altruism and reciprocity evolved in the EEA, individu-
als should cooperate in those instances where conditions do not
deviate far from the EEA. However, where circumstances diverge
from the sort of dilemmas and social interactions present in the
EEA, evolutionary cooperation may be absent. For example, in
one-time market transactions between unknown parties, or rela-
tions between nations, the evolutionary psychologist would not
expect altruistic or reciprocal cooperation.
This understanding of cooperation can alter social sciences that
do not currently embrace the teachings of evolutionary biology.
These fields, such as philosophy, political science, and economics,
all posit conceptions of mankind on which their theories rely. But,
as evolutionary analysis shows, a number of these foundational as-
sumptions are in error. Economics, for example, relies on the
conception of the rational man. But behavioral economics7 and
evolutionary studies of the brain as a cognitive processor demon-
strate that man is far from rational.88 Given this divergence, an
evolutionarily sensitive analysis of human nature can lead to useful
amendments to economic and other social science models.
This project of reform has particularly important implications
for the law. In its attempt to regulate behavior, the law relies on
85. RIDLEY, supra note 36, at 249.
86. Hoffman et. al., Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evo-
lutionary Psychology, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 335,337 (1998).
87. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahne-
man et al. eds., 1982).
88. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 QJ. ECON. 99
(1955); PINKER, supra note 21, at 20.
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conceptions from philosophy, economics, and other social sciences
in formulating legal policy. But in some instances, where the aca-
demic theories underpinning the law improperly characterize
human nature, suboptimal laws will result. As Daniel Langevoort
writes: "Nearly all interesting legal issues require accurate predic-
tions about human behavior to be resolved satisfactorily."s9 Along
this line, a proper understanding of behavior as provided by EA
can help perfect the law as a motivational and regulatory tool.
James Wilson, the Enlightenment philosopher, offered support
for this endeavor:
In every art and in every disquisition, the powers of the mind
are the instruments, which we employ; the more fully we un-
derstand their nature and their use, the more skillfully and
the more successfully we shall apply them. In the sublimest
arts, the mind is not only the instrument, but the subject also
of our operations and inquiries. The poet, the orator, the phi-
losopher work upon man in different ways and for different
purposes. The statesman and the judge, in pursuit of the no-
blest ends, have the same dignified object before them. An
accurate and distinct knowledge of his nature and powers, will
undoubtedly diffuse much light and splendor over the science
of the law. In truth, law can never attain either the extent or
the elevation of science, unless it be raised upon the science
-of man.
90
It is this project that Wilson discussed in the 1800s-fusing the sci-
ence of man and the law-that EA attempts today. However, EA is
not simply about explaining the behaviors evolution assigned us.
That is primarily the realm of evolutionary biology and psychology.
Instead, EA attempts to take the next step,. combining the under-
standing of human nature revealed by evolutionary science with
the law to recast legal rules predicated on false assumptions.
89. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv' 1499 (1988). He goes on to state,
Judges, policy makers, and academics invoke mental models of individual and social
behavior whenever they estimate the desirability of alternative rules, policies, or pro-
cedures. Contemporary legal scholarship has come to recognize that if these
predictions are naive and intuitive, without any strong empirical grounding, they are
susceptible to error and ideological bias.
Id. at 1499-1500.
90. JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 207 (James De
Witt Andrews ed.,1896).
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At the same time, EA does not intend to overthrow the other
explanatory schemes currently applied to the law. EA holds that, by
and large, law and economics does a remarkably good job of creat-
ing and critiquing legal rules. Rather, EA should be applied in
those instances where law and economics' predictions fall short
and its incentive structure fails to motivate behavior.
Some of these applications appear in the existing EA literature.
Owen Jones, currently the chief proponent of EA, introduced evi-
dence of how the law at large (not just law and economics)
misunderstands the nature of rape and child abuse.9' Using evolu-
tionary analysis, Jones demonstrated how reformulations of the law
that acknowledge evolutionary input on human behavior might
better prevent these terrible crimes. In another Note, I applied
evolutionary analysis to employment discrimination to argue that
the law's incomplete understanding of stereotyping results in se-
vere under-regulation of discrimination in the workplace.9" In
applying an evolutionary informed view of stereotyping, I showed
how the law should be reformed in order to ensure Congress
achieves its articulated goals in regulating employment discrimina-
tion.93
This Note will continue in this vein by examining how an under-
standing of the evolution of cooperation applies to previous legal
scholarship and can impact existing legal rules. First, this Note will
add to the ongoing discussion on how EA can help theorize some
of behavioral law and economics' ("BLE") observations.94 Second,
the Note will demonstrate how evolutionary cooperation can ex-
plain the equal sharing default rule in partnership law and help
shape efficient regimes of trade.
A. Reforming Legal Scholarship: Theorizing
Behavioral Law and Economics
Since its inception, law and economics has demonstrated im-
pressive resilience. The paradigm, generally stated, holds that
"legal rules are best analyzed and understood in light of standard
91. SeeJones, Biology of Rape, supra note 7;Jones, Child Abuse, supra note .7.
92. Parekh, supra note 7.
93. Id. at 243-44.
94. For an earlier discussion of this, see Parekh, supra note 7;Jones, Time, supra note 7.
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economic principles., 95 Its task "is to determine the implications
of. .. rational maximizing human behavior in and out of markets,
and its legal implication for markets and other institutions."9 6 With
this foundation, law and economics explains the bases of a number
of laws and suggests revisions where appropriate. Given the parsi-
mony of rational choice theory, its recommendations often lead to
novel and efficient legal rules.
This success, however, is not absolute. A major flaw of law and
economics is its assumption that individuals are rational actors.
Empirical evidence amassed by behavioral economists and psy-
chologists shows that man is far from completely rational. Legal
scholars embraced these findings and examined law and econom-
ics from the new paradigmatic perspective of behavioral law and
economics. These theorists revealed that a number of law and eco-
nomics' predictions proved false, and hinted that for optimal legal
regulation some rules based on the rationality principle needed
amendment.
97
Law and economics did not welcome the critique. Richard Pos-
ner, its vocal champion, questioned the applicability of behavioral
explanations of human behavior for the law.98 He further chided
BLE for its dearth of parsimony.99 But his main critique of BLE was
that it lacked an underlying motivational premise akin to law and
economics' rational choice theory. Posner wrote:
[BLE] is undertheorized because of its residual, and in con-
sequence purely empirical character. Behavioral economics is
defined by its subject rather than by its method and its subject
is merely the set of phenomena that rational-choice models
(or at least the simplest of them) do not explain. It would not
be surprising if many of these phenomena turned out to be
unrelated to each other, just as the set of things that are not
95. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAV-
IORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 14 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) [hereinafter BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS]. For a literature review of BLE scholarship see Langevoort, supra note
79. The generally cited reference to law and economics is RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE LAw (1973).
96. Jolls, supra note 95, at 14.
97. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 95. A major focus was
the inadequacy of the economic model of rational choice. As Daniel Farber noted in his
review of behavioral law and economics, "[t ] he contribution of the behavioralists is to bring
to bear an increasingly large and persuasive body of experimental evidence ... that rational
choice theory can be a poor predictor of human behavior." Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New
LegalRealism, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 282-83 (2001) (book review).
98. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1551 (1998).
99. Id. at 1559.
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edible by man include stones, toadstools, thunderclaps, and
the Pythagorean theorem. Describing, specifying, and classify-
ing the empirical failures of a theory is a valid and important
scholarly activity. But it is not an alternative theory.'°0
In essence, because BLE lacks a theory, Posner held it made little
contribution to the prospective creation of rules.
Soon thereafter, EA entered the debate.'' It agreed with Pos-
ner-without a theory, BLE suffered. Theories, as the philosophy
of science has shown, serve a number of functions, among them
highlighting causes.' Absent a theory, BLE is simply a laundry list
of observations that provide little or no predictive utility. As Russell
Korobkin notes, "[e]mpirical observation alone could serve as the
basis for predicting behavior only if every possible future situation
could be observed ex ante either in the real world or in a labora-
tory.' 03 Theories do more-they provide explanations which
enable us to predict behaviors rather than simply catalogue them
ex post.
More centrally, EA held that evolutionary science itself could
provide the missing motivational theory necessary to explain the
ample experimental data accumulated by the behavioralists.' ° How
so? BLE holds that humans are irrational given their observed de-
parture from such economic concepts as expected utility theory
and rational choice. Essentially, humans are unable to behave logi-
cally because of bounded willpower, bounded self-interest, and
bounded rationality.0 5 But EA more specifically explains this diver-
gence between predicted and actual behavior by arguing that the
cognitive defects BLE discovered are not truly defects at all. Rather
they are "irrationalities" that result when a brain, programmed to
perform only those algorithms present during the EEA, is chal-
lenged to tackle novel problems. Because the brain is specifically
geared to solve those dilemmas humans and our genetic predeces-
sors faced during hominid evolution, we are unable to perform a
number of tasks, including the rational calculations demanded by
100. Id. at 1559-60.
101. Parekh, supra note 7;Jones, Time, supra note 7.
102. See generally Parekh, supra note 7, 213-16.
103. Russell Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behav-
ioral Economics, and Evolutionary Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICSJ. 319, 328 (2001).
104. See generally Parekh, supra note 7; Jones, Time, supra note 7. Posner himself hinted
at the use of evolutionary science in explaining the findings of BLE. Posner, supra note 98, at
1561-64.
105. Jolls, supra note 95, at 14-16.
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economics. 106 Given this, we can forecast that the type of behavior
BLE observes-behavior that cannot be predicted by expected util-
ity theory and rational choice-will arise when our evolutionarily
bounded brain attempts to solve ecologically unfamiliar tasks.
Professor Jones summarizes the manner in which EA can ex-
plain BLE's observations: "In sum, evolutionary analysis ... raises
the hypothesis ... that at least a significant subset of puzzlingly ir-
rational behavior ... are probably the result of substantively
rational behavior that simply surfaces in the wrong era, facing
novel environmental conditions that render once adaptive behav-
ior maladaptive-and once rational behavior irrational.',
0 7
This Note extends this analysis to similarly show that the appar-
ently irrational and unselfish behavior observed by BLE-behavior
that challenges the traditional economic expectation of humans as
purely self-interested actors-can be explained by EA with a discus-
sion of the evolution of cooperation.
B. Explaining Cooperation and Fairness
Humans do a number of things that confound economists.
Among them, we manage to partake in costly acts that have no visi-
ble benefit. Tipping "on the road," where the quality of repeat
service is not at risk, provides .the prototypical example. In an at-
tempt to explain this type of behavior, economists invoke such
principles as the notion of "psychic income. '10 This concept holds
that people tip because it provides a sense of pleasure that tilts the
balance of cost versus benefit on the side on benefit.0 " This, how-
ever, begs the question-why is this behavior pleasurable?"0
Behavioral law and economics recognizes this predisposition for
over-cooperativeness in other scenarios. Using a simple tool, the
Ultimatum Game, BLE demonstrated that people will cooperate,
106. Parekh, supra note 7, at 212. ProfessorJones refers to the dissonance between his-
torically adaptive behavior and modern environments as "time-shifted rationality." Jones,
Time, supra note 7, at 1172. This concept observes that "any trait resulting from the opera-
tion of evolutionary processes on brains that, while increasing the probability of behavior
that was adaptive in the [EEA], leads to substantively irrational or maladaptive behavior in
the present environment." Id.
107. Jones, Time, supra note 7, at 1186.
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even in single-shot interactions."' Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler pro-
vide a brief description of this game:
[O]ne player, the Proposer, is asked to propose an allocation
of a sum of money between herself and the other player, the
Responder. The Responder then has a choice. He can either
accept the amount offered to him by the Proposer, leaving the
rest to the Proposer, or he can reject the offer, in which case
both players get nothing"
2
Economics predicts that a Proposer will offer the lowest amount
and the Responder will always accept because any gain is better
than none at all." 3 In actuality, Responders routinely reject low of-
fers and Proposers, almost anticipating this response, rarely offer
less than half the total amount."
4
How do we explain this phenomenon? Traditional economics
proffers no plausible answer for unself-interested behavior. BLE
attempts to rationalize this phenomenon by contending that peo-
ple have a tendency for "reciprocal fairness.""' This model holds
that a fairness quotient exists in each participant's utility functions.
In essence, BLE argues that "[h]uman behavior, including human
choice behavior, is a complex function of many known and un-
known factors. Economic variables play an important, sometimes
determinative role in the equation. But so do [many others]. ,, 6
BLE indicates that this fairness principle demonstrates that hu-
mans, contrary to the belief of law and economics, express only
bounded self-interest rather than ruthless selfishness.
But while BLE's empiricism effectively challenges the self-
interest presumption of law and economics, its explanation for
these very important findings proves incomplete. Just as with the
question begging economic notion of psychic income, BLE does
not explain why one outcome seems fairer than another. EA, in
contrast, parsimoniously provides an explanation for BLE's ob-
served cooperation. EA holds that this cooperation is not a result
111. Jolls, supra note 95, at 21-23. For a detailed analysis of this game see, Werner Guth
et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982);
Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59J. Bus. S285 (1986).
112. Jolls, supra note 95, at 21.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 22. See also, Ridley, supra note 39, at 139-40; Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H.
Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation,J. ECON. PERSP. 187 (1998).
115. Jolls, supra note 95, at 24.
116. Jacob Jacoby, Is it Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer Psychologi-
cal Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 81,84-85 (2000).
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of psychic income or fairness quotients; it is instead the modern
manifestation of our evolutionary innate predisposition to cooper-
ate.'1
7
EA notes that tendencies to cooperate, just like other economic
anomalies such as inconsistent preferences"8 and the framing ef-
fect," 9 result from a brain programmed to ensure survival in the
EEA. As has been shown, the brain possesses an algorithm that en-
courages us to cooperate both with kin and non-kin in small group
settings. This particular strategy prospered because it, as compared
to unabashed self-interest, provided an evolutionarily stable strat-
egy for the survival of our genes. And, since we still possess the
brain selected through evolution, this penchant for cooperation
persists today.
Economist Vernon Smith reinforces the theory that cooperation
in the ultimatum bargaining game, frequent in one-shot plays and
perpetual in iterated games, results not from fairness but from re-
ciprocity.2" Smith argues that Proposers instinctively offer a more
than economically rational portion of the pot because they, like the
vampire bats discussed earlier, know that where they refuse to
scratch another's back today, they could be refused a reciprocal
back scratching tomorrow. In essence, Proposers routinely enact a
Tit-for-Tat strategy. Such cooperation does not result from a gen-
eral sense of fairness or justice; rather the parties are in essence
instinctively trading. They are being unselfish in the hope that they
can later benefit from reciprocal generosity: "Tell your children to
be good, not because it is... superior, but because in the long run
it pays."'2 ' Our innate affinity for cooperation developed for this
reason and still phenotypically expresses itself today.
This genetic norm of reciprocity serves another function. Aside
from ensuring that a favor will later be returned once a game has
begun, reciprocity also determines with whom we play the game.
Cooperators will be preferred partners over suspected defectors.
This understanding of reciprocity demonstrates that "reciprocators
117. See, e.g.,Jones, Time, supra note 7, at 1176. ("The [time-shifted rationality analysis]
suggests that seemingly irrational tipping exists because of the adaptive value of reciprocal
altruism ... operative in small communities, notwithstanding the fact that technology has
quite recently made such communities rare." (emphasis added)); Posner, supra note 98, at
1161-63.
118. Jones, Time, supra note 7, at 1175.
119. Rode & Wang, supra note 27. The framing effect demonstrates that individuals re-
spond to dilemmas and vary their decisions based upon how choices are phrased. See
generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversy, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
120. See the discussion of Smith in RIDLEY, supra note 39, at 140-41.
121. Id. at 141.
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precipitate out of society, leaving the selfish rationalists to their
fate. The virtuous are virtuous for no other reason than that it en-
ables them to join forces with others who are virtuous, to mutual
benefit."0
22
The tendency to cooperate proved rational in the EEA because
it ensured survival. But note that while it suited humans well in the
past, it occasionally proves inconsistent with modern life. Contrary
to BLE's claims of bounded rationality and bounded self-interest,
this does not mean that we are irrational actors. "Instead, it proba-
bly reflects time-shifted rationality, in which a generally adaptive
predisposition is temporarily mismatched to today's evolutionarily
unique conditions." 2 Whereas during the EEA we most often in-
teracted with kin (giving rise to altruism) or individuals we likely
encountered daily (giving rise to reciprocity), today "we interact a
great deal with strangers. But our instincts are easily fooled when
confronted with conditions to which human beings never had a
chance to adapt biologically," 24 such that we still frequently coop-
erate in a manner inconsistent with rational choice theory.
EA then amends the claims of economics and behavioral eco-
nomics, which assert that individuals irrationally cooperate because
they insist on including quasi-economic or non-economic elements
into their calculations of expected utility. Rather than exhibiting
irrationality:
[T]he human mind...may often be better than rational. On
evolutionarily re-current computational tasks, such as object
recognition, grammar acquisition, or speech comprehension,
the human mind greatly outperforms the best artificial prob-
lem-solving systems that decades of research have produced,
and it solves large classes of problems that even now no hu-
man-engineered systems can solve at all.
2 5
However, despite its prowess, the human mind will not purpose-
fully generate behavior that conforms with economic rational
choice. Instead, non-rational behavior can emerge given manifesta-
tions of our evolutionary proclivity for cooperation. As Posner
writes:
122. Id. at 147.
123. Jones, Time, supra note 7, at 1177.
124. Posner, supra note 98, at 1561.
125. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 25, at 329.
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Voting, giving to charities, and refraining from littering, in
circumstances in which there is neither visible reward for
these cooperative behaviors nor visible sanctions for defec-
tion, may illustrate an instinctual, and as it were biologically
mistaken, generalization of cooperation from small-group in-
teractions, in which altruism is rewarded (hence reciprocal)
and failures to reciprocate punished, to large-group interac-
tions in which the prospects of reward and punishment are so
slight that cooperation ceases to be rational.
2 6
Not only does this explain BLE's observations, but also helps us
understand why this instinct of cooperation that exists in iterated
interactions among either kin or small groups does not prevail in
modem settings. It shows why, for example, the instinct to cooper-
ate does not prevent terrorism or preclude wars.
In sum, humans are often generous and unselfish because this
tendency was hard-wired into the brain by the engine of natural
selection. Accordingly, commonly observed irrationalities will re-
sult when the brain attempts to negotiate dilemmas that did not
exist in the EEA. Given this comprehension, theorists can predict
seemingly irrational behavior. These predictions can then be veri-
fied by BLE's empirical studies. Combining the motivational theory
proposed by EA and the findings outlined by BLE, moves the dis-
cipline from a catalogue of observations to a predictive device that
can enable us to enact effective legal rules prospectively.
C. Reforming Legal Regulations
Aside from theorizing behavioral law and economics, evolution-
ary analysis and the law can also suggest whether current laws are
adequate and how to best amend faulty rules. This project is no
different from the goal of law and economics, but instead of rely-
ing on economic axioms, EA grounds its examination on
evolutionary insights to human behavior.
One area to apply EA is the regulation of transactions, both be-
tween individuals and between institutions. This is particularly true
given the implications of an evolved predisposition towards coop-
eration. In its most cerebral form, a consideration of innate
cooperation challenges the need for legal. regimes to govern ex-
changes in the first place. As Cogmides and Tooby report:
126. Posner, supra note 98, at 1562.
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Instead of the traditional view that selfishness is 'natural' and
altruism is only imposed socially against natural inclination,
evolutionary biology has discovered that altruism and coop-
eration can be as natural as selfishness. In fact, these analyses
have shown that Hobbes was quite wrong: Cooperation can
emerge in the absence of a Leviathan, and adaptations for the
expression and regulation of cooperation and altruism are
expected design features of social organisms.1
7
Social interaction existed long before laws, and systems of trade
whereby actors conduct exchanges of mutual benefits have "been
part of the human condition for at least as long as Homo sapiens has
been a species." 2 1 In light of this, perhaps EA should recommend a
general scheme of laissezfaire that simply relies on natural coopera-
tion to provide order in our daily lives.
A careful application of EA, however, does not counsel this sug-
gestion. The cooperation selected for during hominid evolution
serves humans only in particular environs; it helps in interacting
with kin and in repeat contact with non-kin. Modern commerce,
however, involves much broader interactions. It routinely entails
exchanges between unequal parties-for instance the lone pur-
chaser against retail giants. Contemporary trade over the internet
occurs between parties who often never meet once, let alone mul-
tiple times. And exchanges today travel on more of a one-way street
than, say, the interactions between vampire bats. We frequently buy
from retail outfits, but these sellers rarely look to us for an equiva-
lent purchase at a later date. Our cooperative systems of altruism
and reciprocity simply did not evolve to face these relations.
Increased group size catalyzed the environmental divergence be-
tween the EEA and today. Throughout the course of evolutionary
development, humans lived in societies of fewer than one hundred
people. 29 Over time, as population grew, human group size in-
creased. This inflated group size stressed individual survival
because, with a larger number of transactors, reciprocity proved a
less beneficial strategy. The innate tendency to cooperate, devel-
oped in an environment of a few individuals whom we could recall
and transact with repeatedly, was less effective in this social setting.
As anthropologist Polly Wiessner describes:
127. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 31, at 161.
128. Ridley, supra note 39, at 200.
129. Janet L. Landa & Xiao-Tian Wang, Bounded Rationality of Economic Man: Decision
Making under Ecological, Social, and Institutional Constraints, 3 J. BIOECONOMICS 217, 221
(2001).
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Throughout the course of history, with increasing population,
inter-group competition and new techniques for harnessing
energy and storing wealth, humans formed ever larger and
more complex social groups. Membership in larger social
groups confers many benefits, but the greater anonymity of
such groups introduces ever more risk into transactions.
30
This novel environment demanded newer strategies to ensure sur-
vival.
However, increasing group size did not purge humans of the co-
operative tendency. First, evolution during the EEA permanently
wired human brains with a predilection for altruism and reciproc-
ity. Second, humans still rely on strategic cooperation in small-
group interactions. As X.T. Wang notes, "size is a powerful and par-
simonious contextual cue for activating specific mechanisms that
have been designed to solve important problems posed by human
small-group living." 13 1 In light of this, cooperation emerges. Where
group size is limited, the evolutionary stable strategy of coopera-
tion kicks in.
This shows that EA does not recommend abandoning external
regulation of social interactions, namely trade. At the same time,
however, EA advises that because cooperation will still emerge in
small-groups settings, regulatory rules should be tailored to the
appropriate context. Different, if not less, intervention is required
to govern small-group interactions.
The laws pertaining to close corporations provide a good exam-
ple of this dissonance between large and small-group regulation.
13
In monitoring these entities, the law, though providing a set of al-
ternative statutes for close corporations, largely draws from the
rules that regulate publicly held corporations. 13 3 These conventions
for public corporations attempt to discourage opportunistic behav-
ior through the use of onerous legal and market incentives. 34 Via a
system of required contractual agreements and expected duties
(such as the fiduciary duty and the business-judgment rule), the
law endeavors to encourage cooperation between shareholders,
officers, and employees of large entities. Whether these attempts
succeed is not a question for this Note, but it seems unlikely that
130. Wissener, supra note 61, at 37.
131. X.T Wang, Kith and Kin Rationality in Risky Choice: Theoretical Modeling and Cross-
Cultural Empirical Testing, in Risxy TRANSACTIONS 51 (Frank K. Salter ed., 2002).
132. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Founda-
tions of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. Rv. 1735, 1800-08 (2001).
133. See 18AAm.JuR. 2D Corporations § 747 (2003).
134. Blair & Stout, supra note 132, 1735.
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relying solely on evolved human behavior will effectively control
these monstrous institutions. As a result, market incentives and le-
gal regulations should be preferred.
At the same time, such extensive oversight may not be necessary
for close corporations. Self-selected groups of people who trust one
another most often form these entities.1 15 Given the small number
of actors in such scenarios, pre-existing notions of trust and reputa-
tion, the frequent interaction of members, and the constant
opportunity to punish those who do not cooperate, reciprocity
norms themselves can adequately ensure cooperation in close cor-
porations while discouraging opportunism. As a result, it would be
possible to do without cumbersome legal regulation. At the very
least, the law should acknowledge that incentives aimed at encour-
aging cooperation in large-group settings will either be
unnecessary or ineffective in the small-group environment.
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout's study advocates such an under-
standing and humility in our regulation of institutions. They write:
The case of the closely held corporation illustrates how busi-
ness relationships characterized by a high degree of mutual
vulnerability can survive and thrive even when legal and mar-
ket forces are largely absent or impotent. As importantly, it
suggests how attempts to discourage opportunism by appeal-
ing to the law can sometimes backfire and lead to an increase
in misbehavior.
1 36
This discussion demonstrates that recognizing the evolved predis-
position to cooperate, along with understanding that this tendency
will express itself in particular environments, can help assess the
effectiveness and propriety of legal rules. It is a prime example of
how EA can effectively influence the law.
EA, through the evolution of cooperation, can add more insight
into the governance of trade and exchange. First, knowledge of the
innate tendency to cooperate can ensure that legal rules account
for the realities of human behavior. Applying such knowledge, as
will be shown, can help ensure that laws impose limited private and
social costs. Second, systems of biological cooperation-i.e. recip-
rocity-can provide functional examples of efficient business
models. As reciprocity prevailed in the daunting environment of
135. Id. at 1802-04.
136. Id. at 1805.
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evolution, perhaps institutions of exchange governed by this strat-
egy can excel equally well today.
3 7
D. Reducing the Costs of Evolutionarily Insensitive Rules
Legal rules that ignore human realities will prove inefficient.
Imagine a legislature working under the false assumption that all
Americans speak fluent Latin; relying on this impression, they re-
quire that contractual agreements be drafted in that language.
This, no doubt, would cause innumerable problems. If people ad-
hered to such a law, their activities would prove more costly
because, instead of simply conducting business in English, they
would be forced to either learn a new language or spend valuable
resources translating contracts to and from Latin. Even if the law
permitted negotiation around the rule, the commensurate transac-
tion costs endemic to negotiation would drive up the price of
contractual relationships. Either way, a rule that is insensitive to
human behavior raises the costs of mutual agreements. 38
Professor Thomas Smith uses this recognition to explain the
roots of partnership law.39 Since the Institutes ofJustinian, the law of
partnership dictated the default rule that partners should divide
their profits equally.4 0 Smith argues that this rule persists because it
is intuitive: it is the rule laymen would themselves have selected, in
the absence of law. Using Nash bargaining principles and later evo-
lutionary theory, he notes that a preference for equal sharing
naturally reflects our evolutionary tendency to cooperate. Smith
writes:
Relatively simple, default rule partnerships are similar to the
small, nomadic bands in the EEA in which egalitarian sharing
and decision making probably prevailed. It may be that as
small, cooperative and productive groups, default rule part-
137. Robert Axelrod's famous book, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION, supra note 38,
relies on this assumption to suggest reciprocity be used as a model for transnational rela-
tionships and resolving intra-governmental agency conflicts.
138. This can be applied to our discussion of the close corporation. When the law at-
tempts to place restrictions on close corporations, where reciprocity alone would have
provided stability, these regulations impose extra costs on the entity. Further, those partici-
pants who realized this ex ante, likely regressed to their evolutionary tendency to cooperate
and contracted around the legal regulations. This itself would waste valuable resources due
to transaction costs. A rule that precluded all of this would prove most efficient.
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nerships invoke psychological predispositions that evolved in
humans during the EEA to coordinate production and distri-
bution of food. These predispositions tend to be egalitarian
with respect to sharing and governance. Their existence may
make egalitarian default rules more efficient than would be
inegalitarian rules in this particular setting of small group
production.
In essence, Smith notes that an equal sharing rule reflects our
natural tendency to cooperate. Because this default is sensitive to
the truths of human behavior, it results in model efficiency. Again,
where a rule conforms with human behavior, individuals can ar-
ticulate through the law their genetic predisposition to cooperate.
When the law diverges with innate cognitive mechanisms, natural
tendencies will induce actors to negotiate around the rule and
agree on an alternative that permits expression of their expected
behavior. This supplemental contracting, however, drains re-
sources. Accordingly, EA directs that where appropriate, a default
rule should conform to instinctive behavior and reduce private and
social costs.
This claim does not advocate that all legal rules should auto-
matically consider evolutionary developed human behavior in their
mandates. Ofteh, evolutionary predispositions diverge from mod-
ern conceptions of right and wrong. Take, for example,
stereotyping. 42 Humans have a natural tendency to categorize ob-
jects, including human beings. This process of categorization
requires visual recognition cued by particular memorized charac-
teristics. But while categorization helps people distinguish between
a rock and a car, by negotiating a mental checklist of characteris-
tics, it also results in the stereotyping of individuals. Humans use
visual clues and characteristics to differentiate between people as
well as objects. This, unfortunately, leads humans to use visual and
physical characteristics, such as race, age, and gender, to discover
one's identity. But the law should not encourage stereotyping sim-
ply because evolution created a brain that functions in this
manner. Only where the behavior created by natural selection con-
forms with societal norms should the law create a default rule that
responds to evolutionary tendencies. Since, for example, equal
sharing appeals to modern sensibilities, it is an appropriate candi-
date for a default rule.
141. Id. at 118.
142. Parekh, supra note 7, at 240-45.
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E. Cooperation as a Model of Efficient Business Structuring
The fact that cooperation prevailed as a strategy during the
course of evolution says something about its efficiency; coopera-
tion successfully regulated human interaction for thousands of
years. In part because of rampant cooperation and small-group
size, there was no need for a central Leviathan 143 during the early
periods of human existence.
But, as noted, group size changed all of this. When size bal-
looned, new methods of controlling social interactions developed.
At first these schemes were extra-legal: 44 a prime example of this is
merchant self-regulation. 145 In the l1th century merchants began
to regularly travel beyond their home districts to trade. But with
transactions in distant lands came fear that no foreign sovereign
would enforce an alien merchant's rights: a breach of contract, the
worry was, would have no remedy. In response merchants devel-
oped their own regulatory regime, that of the lex mercatoria.
When governments eventually took a hands-on approach to
commercial regulation, the results were frequently disastrous.
1 46
This failure stemmed partly from an inability to realize the nature
of human interaction. Elinor Ostrom provides an example of this:
The "tragedy of the commons" is based on the assumption
that rational individuals are helplessly trapped in social di-
lemmas from which they cannot extract themselves without
inducement or sanctions applied from the outside. Many
policies based on this assumption have been subject to major
failure and have exacerbated the very problems they were in-
tended to ameliorate.
47
Global attempts at nationalization prove illustrative of this fail-
ure.148 The demise of the Green Revolution and the economic
crumble of the old Soviet bloc provide additional historical proof.
In light of the fiasco of public over-regulation and the success of
reciprocity during evolution, EA suggests that perhaps regimes of
control should center on the principles of evolutionary coopera-
143. See generally THOMAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (M. Oakeshotted. 1957)(1651).
144. Ridley, supra note 39, at 202.
145. See id. at 202-04.
146. Id.
147. Ostrom, supra note 65, at 3.
148. Ridley, supra note 39, at 236.
[VOL. 37:3
When Nice Guys Finish First
tion.49 To achieve this end, systems of trade and business need to
recreate the type of environment in which cooperation prevails-
namely, situations where reputation information is readily available
either in fact or through signals that approximate trustworthiness.
Before describing where this approach has already succeeded, it
is necessary to briefly discuss the naturalistic fallacy. This logical
error argues that the products of evolution are ideal. It argues that
because the engine of natural selection created certain behaviors,
these are proper and moral. The fallacy rests in deducing an
"ought" from an "is." 150
But the naturalistic fallacy fails to recognize that evolution
comes attached with no normative valuation. This was the central
flaw of Social Darwinism. Accordingly, simply because some innate
human tendencies may lead people to commit crimes does not
mean that these crimes should be excused. Similarly, we should not
endorse cooperation or reciprocity as models of regulation be-
cause they are products of evolution. Rather, we should condone
and encourage evolutionary tendencies only when they conform to
societal norms.
Additionally, simply because cooperation was an evolutionary
stable tactic that prospered does not mean that it is the most suc-
cessful of all strategies. Rather, it was one of many possible
techniques that randomly emerged during evolution and persisted,
not because it was the best possible method, but because it was su-
perior to the alternatives. Just as human bodies are imperfect
because genes did not require flawlessness to perpetuate, so too is
cooperation not necessarily ideal. We should therefore not opt for
cooperation-centric regimes merely because altruism and reciproc-
ity emerged unscathed from evolution. Rather we should do so
because cooperation is intuitively a better strategy that its alterna-
tives. That said, evolutionary analysis, through its elucidation of the
successful strategy of cooperation, can aid the law. Cooperation, an
effective though imperfect tactic in the EEA, might help improve
modern institutional relationships-particularly those of trade.
Substantial work in demonstrating this has already been done,
though not officially under the umbrella of EA studies. Two exam-
ples spring from the scholarship of Lisa Bernstein 51 and Janet
149. See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 65, at 3.
150. The naturalistic fallacy was first termed so by G.E. Moore in PRINCIPIA ETHICA
(1903).
151. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724 (2001).
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Landa."5' Both demonstrate how, absent extensive legal regulation,
cooperation can develop in systems of exchange by fashioning
trading environments that recreate the conditions in which coop-
eration prospered - namely small-group settings (or larger ones
that still provide a similar amount of information on -reputation as
in smaller environments) and the ability to avoid and punish
cheaters. Modern extra-legal networks, such as those controlling
the American cotton trade and Chinese rubber exchange, do just
that by creating reputation-governed regimes that effectively re-
move contract arrangements and disputes from state regulation.
1. Cooperation and the Cotton Trade-The sale of cotton, unlike
most commodities, is not governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code but by the rules of the Liverpool Cotton Association-a pri-
vate legal system with its own rules and arbiters.' 3 To a large extent,
this association has few absolute rules on contracting and trade;
those it does have are bright-line ones that avoid the heavy legal
analysis required of laws employing terms like "reasonable.' ' 4 But
by and large, the association manages to exert control by fostering
cooperation and trust between trading partners through a reputa-
tion-based regime.
Reputation plays a central role to these traders. As one partici-
pant reports, "[reputation] is essential in this business [because]
[m]illions of dollars of business will be done on the basis of a
thirty-second phone call." 55 Accordingly the private legal regime
created a system that freely exchanges reputation information,
both through institutional clearinghouses and social interactions.
Cotton institutions, for instance, "created formal methods of
transmitting reputation information, such as circulars reporting
the names of transactors who refuse to arbitrate or to comply with
an award rendered against them, and, in some associations, infor-
mation bureaus." 156 The industry also forces social bonds between
its members: spouses and children of traders are encouraged to get
together, merchants hunt with one another, and the association
sponsors regular social events.'57 But these social networks serve
more than an entertainment function. In binding these traders
152. Landa & Wang, supra note 129, at 227-31;JANET T. LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND
IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS FOR ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS,
CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE (1995); Janet. T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Ho-
mogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUDIES
349 (1981).
153. Bernstein, supra note 151, at 1724-25.
154. Id. at 1732.
155. Id. at 1746.
156. Id. at 1752.
157. Id. at 1750-52.
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into small, interconnected groups, the industry facilitates gossip
that transmits reputation information. "These networks are so ef-
fective that most transactors know of each other or can call
someone that is in the region to verify some information on a per
son/firm they are considering doing business with. ' ' 1 Those with
poor reputations-those known to deliver low-quality goods, to
perform or pay late, or to fail to renegotiate commitments-are
ostracized. In essence, these defectors are screened out for their
inability (or predicted inability) to cooperate.
This regulatory scheme greatly outperforms traditional legal
regulation of contracts. Unfair dealings are rare. When third party
resolution of disputes is necessary, arbitration is expeditious and
inexpensive. "In short, the industry has succeeded in creating and
maintaining a private legal system in which transactions costs, error
costs, legal system costs, and collection costs are low.
159
2. Cooperation and Chinese Rubber Traders in Southeast Asia-Just
like the exchange of cotton, the rubber trade in Southeast Asia
proves a high risk transaction. Money is advanced without security
and contracts are rarely formal. 160 Accordingly, for businesses to
succeed, traders must possess a high degree of trust in one an-
other. But how do they ensure they are interacting with trustworthy
parties given the number of potential transactors? Traders rou-
tinely rely on the Confucian "calculus of relations" when selecting
whom to deal with.' 6' To summarize, this system directs individuals
to trade with those highest up on a hierarchy of potential trading
partners. 62 At the top (i.e. the preferred partners) are kin and fam-
ily. Further down the list area various groups with increasingly
distant connections to the trader; the list moves from kin to clans-
men and non-relations who speak the same dialect to non-Chinese
traders. 16
3
"In order to economize on contract enforcement costs, a ra-
tional trader will choose his network of trading partners from the
inner most circle, before moving outwards.... "'6 In the absence
of reputation information, such as those provided in the cotton
trade, relationships that ensure subsequent contact provide incen-
tives for cooperation. We saw this with biological systems of
158. Id. at 1752 (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Id. at 1725.
160. Landa & Wang, supra note 129, at 227.
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reciprocity. Whereas the cotton trade provides reputation informa-
tion ex post, the Confusion cultural norms anticipates reputation ex
ante. "For Chinese merchants the Confucian code of ethics thus
serves ... as a cognitive screening and signaling device for efficiently
obtaining information to predict or infer about the degree of
trustworthiness of a potential trading partner."' 6 And to amend any
errors in these predictions, when a trader deals with a defector
from any level of relatedness, that cheater is ostracized from the
trading regime. 66 "In this way [this order] functions as a low-cost
club-like organization, alternative to contract law, which econo-
,,167
mizes on costs of contract enforcement....
F Evaluating the Success of these Markets
In both the cotton and rubber regimes, trading groups that fos-
ter cooperation through reputation-based systems prosper. From
an EA perspective, they succeed for two reasons. First, given that
they involve tight-knit groups, the systems mirror the environment
of the EEA. Accordingly, the traders' brains, with their evolutionary
programming, have the tools to solve any social problems that
arise. Unlike vast and impersonal systems of commerce, these spe-
cialized trade groups involve the type of constant interaction and
the opportunities to punish defection that existed in the EEA. In
constructing an ecologically familiar environment, the regimes
properly take into account, and benefit from, human behavior. As
discussed above in the context of partnership law, this responsible
approach reduces private and social costs.
Second, these regimes prosper because they effectively utilize a
successful method of dealing with social dilemmas: reciprocity. Just
as humans relied on cooperation to survive in the EA, "[a] s human
beings began... to engage in agriculture and long-distance trade,
forms of reciprocity with individuals other than close kin were es-
sential to achieve mutual protection, to gain the benefits of long-
distance trading, and to build common facilities and preserve
common-pool resources.""' Building on this success, this Note and
EA direct that those market structures that encourage reciprocity
follow in the tradition of evolutionary cooperation and prosper.
165. Id. at 229.
166. Id. at 228.
167. Id.
168. Ostrom, supra note 65, at 2.
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These systems can create an incentive for cooperation purely by
ensuring access to accurate reputational information. Since, unlike
vampire bats or humans in pre-historic communities, one member
cannot test the willingness of potential partners to cooperate, pri-
vate legal rules can guarantee that defectors are identified and
weeded out. Through the tools of reputation and the punishment
of ostracism, opportunistic behavior can be curbed and coopera-
tive interaction fostered.
Again, reputational information is necessary because it facilitates
cooperation in interactions where repeat "games" and first-hand
knowledge cannot be guaranteed. As Elizabeth Hoffman, et al.,
note:
If humans are preprogrammed to learn to achieve coopera-
tive outcomes in social exchange, then factors that facilitate
the operation of these natural mechanisms should increase
cooperation even in the presence of contrary individual in-
centives. For example, cooperation should increase if
individuals can observe and monitor one anothers' behaviors
even if there are no direct mechanisms for enforcing specific
behaviors.
169
Specifically, reputation information enables market actors to effec-
tively embrace "Tit-for-Tat" strategies to encourage competition.
This is particularly obvious in Bernstein's discussion of the cot-
ton trade. Her own words best demonstrate this:
[I] n order for cooperation to emerge in a particular market,
transactors must each adopt strategies of cooperating at the
beginning of each contracting relationship and thereafter re-
sponding to cooperative behavior with cooperation and
responding to uncooperative behaviors (defection) with pun-
ishment (such strategies are called 'tit for tat' strategies).
Each transactor must also be able to obtain information about
the reputations of other market participants, and reputation
must be at least partially dependent on how a transactor be-
haved in previous transactions. In addition, each transactor
must be able to observe whether the person he is dealing with
has cooperated or defected.... Because noncooperative re-
sponses tend to reduce his future trading opportunities, the
long-run cost of defection will often be greater than the
169. Hoffman et al, supra note 86, at 339.
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short-term gain from defection, so a transactor who is not in
financial distress is more likely to cooperate than to defect. 70
With reputational information, trade regimes can facilitate coop-
eration among their members. This cooperation, in turn, results in
efficient ordering by reducing the costs of operation. This reality
suggests that following the evolutionary model of reciprocity in
today's business world can lead to success.
Landa repeats that this effective market ordering need not re-
quire a sophisticated private legal regime. As with Chinese rubber
traders, ecologically rational clues of reputation, including kinship
and the probability of recurrent interaction, predict who will be
optimal trading partners. This information can be obtained
cheaply and requires no formal mechanism of conveying reputa-
tion. ' Simply by relying on this evolutionarily sensible proxy for
reputation, these traders, "by economizing on contract-
enforcement and information costs, can out-compete other ethnic
groups.... , In molding economic relations around reciprocity
norms, we can create pareto optimal regimes without the involve-
ment of governments and public law at large.
G. Concluding Part III-Implications
Part III showed how EA can be applied practically to the law. It
examined what changes could result from an understanding of co-
operation as an innate mechanism which developed during the
EEA and persists today in small-group contexts. The list is surely
not exhaustive: not only can EA and the evolution of cooperation
provide other insights, but the numerous other concepts that
emerge from evolutionary studies can and will add even more. The
scholarship is in its infancy, but the coming years are sure to see
further discoveries of the evolutionary roots of behavior as well as
the implications these findings have for the law.
170. Bernstein, supra note 151, at 1763-64.
171. Landa & Wang, supra note 129, at 231.
172. Id. at 230.
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PART IV: CONCLUSION
Despite the value of EA studies demonstrated by this and other
scholarship, a number of theorists question its importance.17 They
challenge EA by questioning the ability of evolutionary science to
ever discover the roots of' human behavior. For example, scientists
do not know enough about the EEA on which so much of evolu-
tionary analysis rests, 74 and the pace of human evolution is so
remarkable that behavior cannot be deciphered by a purely evolu-
17,tionary approach . Critics further note that, even if assessments of
the EEA are correct and scientists know which behaviors natural
selection propagated, the pressures of cultural evolution have
transformed these behaviors completely. 1
76
Additionally, critics note it is difficult to evaluate the accuracy of
evolutionary studies. Robert Wright observes that:
[t]esting theories, of course, is a general problem for evolu-
tionary biologists. Chemists and physicists test a theory with
carefully controlled experiments that either works as pre-
dicted, corroborating the theory, or don't. Sometimes
evolutionary biologists can do that .... But biologists can't
173. For a review of these, see Parekh, supra note 7, at 229-31. These criticisms can be
found in sources relating solely to evolutionary biology and those directly attacking EA.
Examples can be found in the following pieces: JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Comment, Is Evolution-
ary Analysis of Law Science or Storytelling, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 365 (2001); Russell Korobkin, A
Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Evolution-
ary Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319, 328 (2001); Paul Rozin, Evolution and Adaptation in the
Understanding of Behavior Culture, and the Mind, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 970 (2000); Rich-
ard C. Lewontin, The Evolution of Cognition: Questions We Will Never Answer, in 4 AN
INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCES: METHODS, MODELS, AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 107, 108
(Don Scarborough & Saul Sternberg eds., 1998); Steven J. Gould, Sociobiology: The Art of
Storytelling, in NEW SCIENTIST (1978).
174. Rachlinski, supra note 173, at 366-67.
175. Ridley & Dawkins, supra note 59, at 31-32.
[W]e have to admit that Homo sapiens really is a rather unique species. It has trans-
formed the environment at a greater rate, if not a greater extent, than the plants of
the Precambrian which put the oxygen into the atmosphere, or than the corals which
built reefs visible from the moon. It is a species whose main mode of evolution is now
nongenetic and whose behavior it will be impossible to understand only by an evolu-
tionary genetic approach. The evolutionary uniqueness of man is that he is uniquely
inscrutable to biologists interested in adaptation.
Id.
176. See, e.g., Rozin, supra note 173, at 976.
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experiment with human beings.., and they can't conduct the
ultimate experiments: rewind the tape and replay evolution.
7
Given these uncertainties, the critics argue that EA-or any evolu-
tionary study for that matter-is, in the words of Stephen Jay
Gould, 'just-so stories.",17 They argue that EA offers neither the
precision of mathematics or physics nor the parsimony of theories
such as economics.
Though at first glance these criticisms seem tenable, a detailed
analysis shows they do not comprehend the true nature of attempts
to explain and theorize. 179 Among other things, these critiques ig-
nore that unproven scientific explanations have routinely,
throughout the history of science and thought, demonstrated their
intrinsic value.' 80 For example, Newton's laws of gravity and Ein-
stein's theory of relativity could not be proven under the rubric of
science until years after their formulation. To discard evolutionary
studies, including EA, at such an early stage discounts the fact that
proof and tools of verification can develop after-the-fact. 8' And the
complaints that EA embodies just-so stories can be resolved if evo-
lutionary projects employ a responsible and exacting method of
analysis. 82
In the end, this Note and EA claim that "[t]he knowledge of
human nature is of all human knowledge the most curious and
most important." 3 EA also understands that this knowledge must
be attained with the tools of evolutionary science since it is evolu-
tion that formed the brain, the situs of human behavior. In
converging scientific studies of human behavior with the law, EA
attempts to supplement existing theories of law, such as law and
economics, where they fail. This Note has shown how an under-
standing of the evolution of cooperation can do just that.
But EA also recognizes that, throughout history, "in no branch
of knowledge have greater errors, and even absurdities insinuated
themselves, than in the philosophy of the mind."'84 Accordingly, EA
hopes to conduct this fusion between law and evolution responsi-
bly. Among other things, it must simultaneously encourage laws
177. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 193-94.
178. Stephen J. Gould, Sociobiology and Human Nature, in SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED 288
(Ashley Montagu ed., 1980).
179. This response was first stated in Parekh, supra note 7, at 231-34.
180. Id.
181. See generally R!DLEY, supra note 18, at 106.
182. One such method has been outlined by Steven Pinker. PINKER, supra note 21, at
38.
183. WILSON, supra note, at 206.
184. Id. at 208.
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that foster behaviors in keeping with our social norms, and be will-
ing to work against evolutionary tendencies that today strike us as
immoral and unjust. All the while, EA should continue to avoid the
temptations of the naturalistic fallacy: under no circumstances do
evolutionary scientists contend that the laws and products of evolu-
tion are ones that we should blindly champion today simply
because they come from evolution.
When the project of EA is conducted in a conscientious manner,
evolutionary analysis can improve our legal regime. This Note
demonstrated that a cognizance of the roots of human cooperation
can benefit the law by theorizing BLE's findings, by ensuring our
rules result in the fewest and lowest costs, and by providing models
for successful socio-economic interactions. In doing so, this Note
hopes to have demonstrated the value and promise of evolutionary
analysis and the law.

